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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

St. Georqe Thrift and Loan
Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Raymond L. Lowe,
Defendant and Appellee

Case No.
920S52CA
Priority 15

Raymond L- Lowe,
Thi rd-Party
PIai nti ff,
and Appel1ee.
v.
Gregory A- Knox,
Thi rd-Party Defendant.
and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the Order Granting Summary Judgment for the Plaintentered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County
The Honorable James L. Shumate

STATEMENT OF JURSIDICTION

This is an appeal from an order Granting Summary Judgement
for the Plaintiffs entered in the Fifth District Court, by the
Honorable James L. Shumate, on August 11, 1992.
peal was filed on October 26, 1992.

1

A Notice of Ap-

The Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction to hear this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann-,
Section 7B-2a-3 (2) (k).
ISSyES^PRESENIED^FOR^APPEAL
1„

Was it a substantial abuse of discretion bv the Trial

Court to find that no material or genuine issue of fact remained
as to when Gregory Knox disovered the misrepresentation or
fraud?
2.

Did the Trial Court err

as a matter of law in deter-

mining that Gregory Knox discovered the misrepresentation or
fraud in 1986 and not 1991?
DEIERMINAIIVE^AUIHORIIY
Utah Code Ann-, Section 78-12-26 (1953) as amended, is the
central statute relied upon by the Defendant in this case-

In

addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is relied upon with
regard to the Court's granting the Motion of Summary Judgment.
However, because this Statute and Rule are
in full, they are

too lengthy to set out

included in the addendum, pursuant to Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f) and 24(a)(6).
SIRAIidENI^OF^IHE^CASE
This case is on appeal from the Fifth District Court's Order
granting Summary Judgment for the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, finding that the Defendant Gregory Knox's defense of
*7

fraud in the form of innocent misrepresentation was barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
genuine issue oi

Accordingly, the Court found that no

fact existed as to whether Gregory Knox discov-

er ed the all eged f raud i n 1986 or i n 1991.
Raymond L. Lowe sold a parcel of real property to Defendant
Knox in 1986 for $69,900, for $1,000 as a downpayment and a note
for $63,900 dix& in three years.

Lowe subsequently assigned the

note to St. George Thrift and Loan.
ded for two years.

In 1939, the note was exten-

In 1991, the note was not paid, and the prop-

erty was taken by St. George Thrift and Loan in a foreclosure action.

It assigned its right to sue on the note to Raymond Lowe.

Proceedings were instituted on December 3 1 , 1992 against Knox.
Knox's defense was fraud by misrepresentation, discovered in
1991-

Lowe filed a motion for judgment orv the pleadings, which

motion was denied in a hearing before the Honorable Judge James
L. Shumate.

After a deposition of Knox by Lowe's attorney, Lowe

filed a motion for summary judgment.

A hearing was held before

the Honorable Judge James L. Shumate on July 2 2 , 1992.

The court-

ruled from the bench on behalf of the plaintiffs, awarding
$30,721.27 in principal, interest, costs, and attorney's fees.
Judgment was entered on August 11, 1992.

The Notice of Appeal

was filed on October 2 6 , 1992.

SIAIEMENI_0F__IHE_FACIS

I^--^i§ckgrgund_of _the_Case

3

A-

In April, 1936, Gregory Knox, appellant, and Raymond

Lowe, appellee, entered into a contract whereby Knox purchased a
residential
$69,900.

B.

property from Lowe for the advertised price of

(Record, p. 7 7 ) .

In connection therewith, Knox executed a trust deed note

with a personal guarentee in favor of Lowe, in the amount of
$68,900, due in 3 years.

C.

(Record,

p.. 2 ) .

During the negotiations for said purchase, Knox request-

ed permission to obtain an independent appraisal of the property.
Lowe denied this request, which request and denial were witnessed
by Knox and 2 other witnesses.

D.

Knox was new to the area and unexperienced in resident-

ial real estate transactions.

E.

(Record, p. 7 6 ) .

(Record, pp. 195-198).

Lowe claimed special knowledge about the property during

the negotiations regarding the imminent funding of a road which
would make the property much more accessible to surrounding
areas, and, the prospective unobstructive rear view because of
government ownership of adjacent land.

F.

(Record, pp. 207; 2 1 8 ) .

Lowe sold the property with, only a $1,000 downpayment,

and, allowed the purchase to be made with deferred tax and inurance payments, and, without the kind of credit
that would be required to get a bank loan.

G.

qualifications

(Record, p. 2 1 7 ) .

Within a few weeks of the purchase, Knox obtained an

4

opinion letter; not a -full appraisal, -for
ducing investors to advance

the purpose of

mduc-

cash for improvements in exchange

•for a share o-f future appreciation.

This letter had been ob-

tained to state what the value of the property would be with a
••£3,000 to #5,000 investment

to improve the property.

that the value, after improvements, would be $69,500.
,_ ,-.

—i cr ~r „

pU„

i. »_«_>; i H - i l / ?

H.

"i i .1

••"-> i -r „

*-. /••% .-.

It stated
(Record,

.—, r^,.—, •.

ii'J-iili),

Knox judged an actual value of $3,000 to $5,000, or 4"!

to 77. below the price advertised and paid to not be a material
misrepresentation by Lowe.
clusion were the special

Considerations pertinent to this con-

"nothing down" type of purchase terms,

the imminent road construction and the then current real
"boom" in the community.

estate

Using the opinion letter as a base to

project future appreciation, Knox obtained $2,500 from one investor and added a bathroom and a laundry hookup to the property.
He was unable to obtain more investment money and other planned
improvements were not made.

I.

(Record, pp. 214-221).

In 1989, having learned that the road construction on

the property had been delayed, and, that the rear view might
be obstructed after all, Knox sought and obtained a two year extension from Lowe to pay the trust deed note.

Having moved to

California in 1988 and still relying on the 1986 opinion letter,
Knox specifically raised it during these negotiations and

stated

to Lowe that he was satisfied with the 1986 purchase price, in

5

the context of the terms of purchase-

(Record, pp. 198; 207-213;

213-220; 234-235).

J.

In the Spring of 1991, with the property in foreclosure

p r oceedIn g s, Knox learned from Dale Sm i t h, an ex ec u11ve at St.
George Thrift and Loan, that an appraisal

had been done

on the

property in conjunction with a transaction between the bank and
Raymond Lowe-

This appraisal, which included an analysis of sev-

eral comparable properties, (the details of which were given to
Knox over the telephone), in the area which had sold in a time
period

close to the time of Knox's purchase from Lowe, stated

that the property was worth in the neighborhood of -.£52,000, according to information given Knox by Mr. Smith.

(Record, pp. 7S;

223-226).
«•

This was the first time, (Spring, 1991), that Knox had

information that Lowe had materially misrepresented the value of
his property at the time of the purchase.

He had represented a

value, $69,900, that was some $17,900, or 347. above its actual
value.

Upon learning this, Knox realized that the 1986 opinion

letter that he had relied on had probably been a gratuitous
ror.

er-

Also, he notified both appellees, Lowe and St. George

Thrift and Loan, that he would no longer perform or attempt to
perform his duties.to them under the purchase agreement.
(Record, pp. 7 S - 7 9 ) .
L.

St. George Thrift and Loan subsequently regained

pos-

session of the property through legal proceedings, and, sued for

6

the balance due under the trust deed note, plus fees and costs.
Knot's defense was material misrepresentation discovered in 1991.
Lowe was granted summary judgment on the grounds that the alleged
fraud was discovered in 1936 upon receipt of the opinion letter
and that Knox's defense is barred by the statute of limitations.
(Record, pp. 2-35

75-73; 168) .

SyMMARY_OF_THE_ARBUMENTS

1,.

Reasonable minds could differ on whether the 1936 opin-

ion letter which showed a .£3,000 to *5,000 premium on a £70,000
purchase price, in light of the concessions made by the seller in
other terms of purchase, should have prompted the buyer to make
f ur t her i n qui r i es.
2.

In a summary judgment proceeding, the non-moving party

is entitled to have his facts viewed -in the best possible light.

ARGUMENT^

I.

INTRODUCTION:
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment mi states the

applicable standard for measuring the time of discovery of fraud
or

misrepresentation as merely when the aggrieved party has had

"full opportunity" to make the discovery.

In fact, as will be

shown, he must actually have all the facts in his possession, or,
facts that would put a reasonable person on inquiry that fraud
has been committed.

From the language in the Court's "Conclu-

/

sions of Law", (See Record, p. 1 6 8 ) , reproduced

in part below,

it seems that it may have adopted this erroneous view, while paying some lip service to the notion of

reasonable inquiry when put

on alert:
After having obtained possession of the subject real property and the letter of opinion
from C.G. Miller, Third Party Defendant had
fyLi-.9EB2Ctuni.ty (emphasis added) to discover any alleged fraud or mistake and nevertheless failed to make further inquiry regarding
the fair market value of the subject real property QQtw^thstand^^
yeyidL!2§^§_di2tated_^
(emphasi s
added)The key issue here, (especially in a summary judgment act i o n ) , is why "reason would have dictated such action."
Court fails to explain further.

Knox, the defendant, looked upon

the 1936 opinion letter as a reason not to make further
Many facts in the record back up his reasoning.
73-79; 214-221; 234-235).

The

inquiry.

(See Record, pp.

If other reasonable minds, such as

those belonging to triers of fact, cgul^d agree that he was not
under a legal duty to inquire further upon receiving the opinion
letter, then, he could win his point that the actual discovery of
the fraud took place in 1986.

Thus, he should be granted a trial

on that issue.
II.

REASONABLE MINDS COULD DISAGREE AS TO THE TIME OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE FRAUD.

A.

THE RULE OF LAW AS TO WHEN DISCOVERY OF FRAUD OCCURS.

Utah Code Ann., Section 78-26-26

8

(1953) as amended,

(see

Addendum) states in its relevant sections
Within three years: - - (3) an action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake; except that the cause
of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party
oi the facts constituting the fraud or mistake„ . „
Case law states that the discovery is deemed to have occ^rriad
two situations, even where the aggrieved party
(1)

claims otherwises

When he has in his possession all of the facts

which would have alerted him to the -frauds
(2)

or

When he discovers facts that would have put a

reasonable person on notice to investigate further.
tions ar&

.in

These situa-

described authoritatively in the following:
a.

The time of the discovery of the existence of

fraud is a question o-f fact, and the possession of all information necessary to discover fraud satisfies the requirements of
the Utah

statute.

See Hgrn^v^Daniel. A 315 F-2d 471

(10th Cir.

1962).
b. One informed of such facts as will put a person
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received such
information as will start the running of limitations.
iibsen^v^^Jensen^^lSS P. 426, (Utah
B.

(See

1916).

KNOX DID NOT DISCOVER THE MISREPRESENTATION

IN 1986.

Knox claims that he had in his possession neither facts constituting the misrepresentation or facts that put him on notice
to make further inquiry, until
223-226).

1991.

(See Record, pp. 78-79;

The controversy revolves around the 1986 opinion let9

ter which Knox received.

(See Addendum

1).

He obtained the let-

ter because the seller had not consented to an appraisal
Knox took possession of the property-

before

(See Record, p n 7 6 ) .

The

purpose of the appraisal, according to the record, was in furtherence of a pre-existing plan to induce investors to contribute funds for improvements in return for participation in future appreciation.
praisal.

The opinion letter was not a full-blown ap-

It was to be based upon a hypothetical

which certain improvements were made.

situation in

Then, Knox could

approach

the investors with a plan in which their contributions would be
applied to improvements and they would share in appreciation from
the post-improvement value stated in the opinion letter.

(See

Record, pp. 253; 214-222).
While the opinion letter, stating a $69,500 post-improvement
value inherently demonstrated that Knox had "paid" a-price that
was $3,000 to £5,000 above market value, it did not constitute
evidence of material or actionable misrepresentation.

Especially

in light of the terms; i.e., $1,000 downpayment, and, anticipation of the construction of a major road which would convert the
area from one of isolation to the center of new development.
(See Record, pp. 212-221).
Nothing in the transaction or the opinion letter alerted
Knox, in his own mind, to even the remote possibility that the
fair market value of the property was actually in the neighborhood of £52,000.

Nowhere in the record does the Plaintiff, Lowe,

10

deny that the actual value was $52,000.

Knox had just moved into

the area from Southern California, where prices are much, much
higher, and, relied reasonably on both Mr. Lowe, (to operate in
good faith and/or with some expertise), and Mr. Miller, who wrote
the opinion letter, who was a realtor and appraiser.

(See

Record, pp. 195-198; 7S-79; 223-226).
While a full-blown appraisal, with comparable properties and
much more information, either by Miller or another appraiser, may
have disclosed what turned out to be errors in the Miller opinion,

(which in turn may have either alerted Knox to facts amount-

ing to a material misrepresentation or put him on inquiry to investigate further), nothing in the Miller appraisal
either.

itself did

This is especially true in light of the circumstances

in which it was obtained and applied, according 1 to Knox's view
of the facts as they appear in the

record.

According to the facts in the record, Knox used the opinion letter not as a basis for an action against Lowe for misrepresentation, or as cause to obtain more detailed
about the property.

information

Instead, he used it to in fact obtain in-

vestment funds and improve the property.

In his own mind, be-

cause of the impending road improvement, (which fact was not accounted for in the opinion letter), he thought that the property
was actually worth the full price paid for it.

(See Record, pp.

214-221; 234-235).
Knox's situation is not unlike that of the plaintiff in the

11

case of Hgiiand^y^^rigretgn, wherein the Court put aside the jury's verdict and ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff had
"discovered" the defendant's fraud more than three years before
the action was brought-

In that case, an attorney acting as a

fiduciary, selling mining claims of a client to third

parties

failed to disclose the final high prices being paid for them.
By such double-dealing, he made considerable "hidden" profits
for hi rnsel f .
The defendant claimed that the plaintiff knew or

should have

known the full nature of the transactions at the time they took
place,

(even though he did not disclose that information).

Fur-

ther, some time later, but still more than three years before
the action, the plaintiff

learned from a 3rd person that unusu-

ally high prices had been paid mining claims such as those sold
by the plaintiff.

He wrote a letter, to which he received no re-

ply, and, had further conversations with the 3rd party, and made
no further

investigations.

In reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate courtstated :
. . . the jury chose to believe the plaintiff s'evidence which was to the effect that
they did not know the facts at the time of
the transaction and that the first knowledge
they had of. the true facts was in October,
1951.
We see no basis in the record to justify a
ruling by the trial court as a matter of law
that the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud
more than three years before the action commenced .
12

Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 939 (Utah

1960).

See also 54^_C^J^S^A_L^m^tatigns_gf._Ab£XQQ§A._§ZJ.fri, 1987, 3rgwn_
¥i-!5§£2-.bi££!!2£Qck_M^

373 A.2d 1138, (New Hamphire

1977), and Hobbs_yJL_Eichl,er, 210 Cal.Rptr. 387 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.
1985).

Knot's situation is much like the plaintiff's in the case

discussed above.

He was unaware o-f the true nature of

comparable

transactions taking place at the time he made his bargain;

he

relied on a -fiduciary who gave misleading information, and, he
received information after the transaction which may have prompted some persons to make a more dilegent inquiry than he did.
However, the jury chose not to hold him to that higher possible
standard.
When Knox -finally made the discovery, in 1991, o-f the true
market value o-f the property he had purchased, he took

immediate

action and brought legal action in the form of an equitable defense within the statutory time limit.

(See Record, pp. 75-79).

A jury should be allowed to make the decision as to whether
Knox's actions in 1986 upon receiving the opinion letter were
reasonable or

C.

not.

A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT STILL EXISTS.
MARY JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER.

THEREFORE, SUM-

A succinct review of arguments and supporting

authority

explaining why a 1986 discovery of fraud should not have been determined as a d«atter_of_l.aw in this case will now be presented;

13

1.

Knox claims that he did not discover the fraud or

misrepresentation
This is a material
2.

in 1936 when he received the opinion letter.
issue of fact which is in dispute.

Knox claims that the 1986 opinion letter neither

placed facts amounting to fraud,

(material misrepresentation.) in

his possession, nor alerted him to the reasonable likelihood of
fraud.

In fact, the opinion letter confirmed to appellant that

there had been no material misrepresentation or fraud.
3-

Reasonable minds could agree with Knox that the 1986

opinion letter did not place facts amounting to fraud in his possession or excite a reasonable mind to further
4.

With a material

fact still in

inquiry.

dispute, (the time of

the discovery of the f r a u d ) , summary judgment was improper.

Authority for the above issues follows below, in the
same numbered orders
iaf

A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis

facts in the r&cord^

reasonable minds could differ on whether

defendant's conduct meassures up to the required standard.
Jacksgn_v^_Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982).
facts are

See

It is only when the

undisputed and where but one reasonable conclusion can

be drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law.
594

E^^ccegtance^Cg^v^Lea^
1979).

14

P. 2d 1332 (Utah

See

2-

The time of the discovery or the existence o-,:
fraud is a guest i.on^of _£ act, and the possession
of all information necessary to discover fraud
satisfies the requirements of the Utah statute,
(emphasis added).

Horn^Vi^Daniel, 315 F.2d 471, p. 474 (10th Cir.

1962).

One informed of such facts as will put a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry has received such
i nf ormat .1. on as wi .11 start the runninq of 1 i mi tat i onsG l k s c n ^ v ^ J e n s e n , 153 P. 426
3.

(Utah

See

1916).

„ . . the jury chose to believe the plaintiffs
evidence which was to the effect that they did
not know the facts at the time of the transaction and that the first knowledge they had of
the true facts was in October, 1951.
We see no basis in the record to justify a ruling by the trial court as a matter_gf._l.aw that
the plaintiffs had knowledge of fraud more than
three years before the action commenced.
(Emphasi s added).

Hgll_and_y._h1gretgn, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989, pp. 994-995

4.

...Although the parties are not in complete
conflict as to certain facts, the understanding,
intention, and consequences of those facts
were vigorously disputed.
These matters can
only be resolved by a trial.

Sandberg_viIL-_Kliei.n, 576 P. 2d 1291, p. 1292 (Utah

1978).

Because disposition of a case by summary

judgment

denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning
questions of fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences
herefrom, should be resolved in favor of opposing party.
§§ehive_Brick_C^^
App.

See

780 P. 2d 327 (Utah Ct.

1989).

15

If there is &nv genuine issue as to anv material,
fact, the motion should be denied.

See Ygung iii v li<B Felornu, 244

F.I'd 8 6 2 , (Utah 1952) ;
As the Court below failed to explain why "reason" dictated f n c : to rnal-e further inquiries noon receipt of the l^^t> op~
injon letter, (See Record, p. 1 6 3 ) , and since F no , vigorously
And reasonably disputes the claim that the letter put him on notice, it should not have been decided as a matter of U w
had discovered the misrepresentation

Ill-

that he

in 1986.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVUE.

A^

Summary^Judgment s_

Ibe_Aggirogri§te_Standard^

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure

56 permits the disposition of a

case if the following three elements are

established by a moving

partys
L

It must be shown that no genuine issue of material

fact e,i I sts.
2.

The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.
3.

This showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all

reasonable possibilities that the losing party could win, if given a trial.
Se&_Ihgrn_v.__CggL, 604 P.2d 636

(Utah 1979);

E'ti5!l!I,g£^S=Stl£Slj.-lDCi.j. 764 P. 2d 636
16

Reeves^^Geig^

(Utah Ct. App-

1988), QQ2Q.&C

St££e_Leas^ng_Cg^_v^_B^

90 Utah Adv.

Rep. 23 (1988); Briggs_v i .JHgLcgmb , 740 P.2d 281

(Utah Ct. App.

1987); IheQS-V^^SeaguII^EntergriseSi^lQCi, 595 P.2d 526

(Utah

1979); Geneva^Pige^Cg^^yi^S&H^InSi^Cgi, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1938);
iQ^d§C^vJL_Berkl,ey, 693 P. 2d 64 (Utah 1984); Bower_y^_Ri verton^
Ci.ty, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah 1982); F r e d e r i c L d § ^ ^ L Q Q i . y L „ D u Q n , 13
Utah 2d 40, 368 P. 2d 266 (1962); Judki.ns_v^_Tggre, 27 Utah 2d17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972);

Builgck^v^JDesertJDgdge^

iQEi., 11 Utah 221, 354 P. 2d 559.(1960); Singietgn_v^_Al.e>iander ,
19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d
1291

126 (1967); Sandberg_Vi._Kl.ei_Q, 576 P.2d

(Utah 1978).

B_

i:<i_§Q£§_i§__i§y^
Loser.-.

A court considering a motion for summary judgment is constrained in a number of ways.

In particular, "all evidence,

admissions and inferences" must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the loser. "

Bu^]i_gck_v^_Desert_Dgd

Utah

201, 354 P.2d 559, "the party against whom the judgment has been
granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the
inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most
favorable to him."

Mgrris^v^^Farnswbrth

123 Utah 289, 259

P.2d 297 (1953); See^Geneya^Pige^Cg^^v^^S^H^Ins^^Cg^, 714 P.2d
648 (Utah 1986);

R§§yes_f jL^Geigv^Pharmaceut^cai^^Inc, 764 P. 2d

636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Cggger_State_Leas^
Eli§Q£§:_EyHQi_QQjLi

90

Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988); Briggs_yi-pHgl.17

comb, 740 P.2d 281
lQ£-.i

5

^ 5 P.2d 526

(Utah Ct. App. 1987); I h e n s . v ^ S e a g u l ^ _Enter ^_
(Utah 1979), or "submission in support of or

opposition to a motion for summary judgment should be locked at
in the light favorable to the non-moving party's position."

Dur-

h5!B_v._Marqetts, 571 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977); i§Lt^U§h§_QLtv _Cgr-..
v ^^I§!B§§ J 5 Q § t r ^ t or s ^^ I nc ^ , 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

In addition, the remedy of summary judgment should be invoked very reluctantly, since it denies the non-winning party the
chance to prove its case to the finder of fact.

"Because a sum-

mary judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their case
to the court, courts are and should be reluctant to invoke this
remedy."

Brandt_y^_Ser ijngy^

P.2d 460

(1960).

10 Utah 20 350, 353

In addition:
Because disposition of a case on summary
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on
the merits, the appellate court must review
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the losing parties, and affirms only where
it appears there is no genuine dispute as
to any material issues of fact, or where,
even according to the facts as contended by
the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
§§e_B§ev§§«^i-§®iay-E!b§!l![D§E!§yti£§Ij._lQ£jL^
App.

7

& 4 p. 2d 636

(Utah Ct.

1988) ; Cgeeer_State_Leasing

F u r n ^ C g ^ , 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1938); Br i g g s ^ y ^ H g l c o m b , 740
P.2d 281

(Utah Ct. App. 1937); Iheng^y^^SeaguII^Enter^^Inc^, 595

P.2d 526

(Utah

1979).
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£~£yl~lC£_d§Y_Ngt:-.Q9Q§lder_Weight_or_yredi_bi

.QJL

1L t y _ . o f _Evi^ ~

dence-

A court may not take into account the weight of evidence as
the credibility ot evidence:
The court cannot consider weight o-f testimony or cred i b i 1 i t v o-f wi tnesses on a mot i on
f o r s u m in a r v j u d g m e n t ; t h e c o u r t si m p 1 y d e t e r m i n e s that t h e r e is no d i s p u t e d issue o-f m a t erial t a c t a r "i d th a t a s a m a 11 e r o -f 1 a w c< n e
par ty shoui d prevai1»

iingleton^v^^AIe^ander, 1? Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d
also^Sandberg^Vi^King, 576 PP. 2d 1291
'ed^Bytte^Silver^Miningi^lQCi., 740 P.2d

126 (1967).

See

(Utah 1978); Sggr.._y._.Crestz
1304 (Utah 1937);

W^^^

1 &27 P. 2d 56 ( 1981 ) .

§£*CQ§!§.-QQjL_Y.jL_§Qd^

i;L-._!B.~Q9y!2£_!l!§Y._^
t.bl§_E§9£s_AreA Court may not use summary judgment to ascertain what the
facts actually are

in a dispute; it may only examine the evi-

dence, affidavits, interrogatories and pleadings to determine if
a material fact issue remains:
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the
facts are^ but only to ascertain whether there are
any material issues of fact in dispute.
HiLl__ex_rel.iJFggeI_vi^^
150 (1970)IQEJLI

74

°

p

-2d

25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d

See_accgrd_Sggr_y^_Crested_^
1309 (Utah 1987); W ^ J ^ B a r n e s j:g^_v^^

aLJSesgurcesJZg.., 627 P. 2d 56 (Utah

F•
E§Eti.

1981).

b§§YY_iycd.§Q_t9_i§t§bIi§b.-D9_G§QyiD§~I§§y§-..9f _!33t§?£i.§I
19

The sufficiency of a controversy as to material fact mav be
established by affidavits, answers to interrogation, depositions,
admissions and the pleadings themselves, although allegations in
a pleading are

insufficient to rebut an affidavit based on per-

sonal knowledge-

The opposing party must simply show the pre-

s er i c e of some mater i a1 f act i ssue that is c on t r over t ed bv aft
davi t or

d i scover y:
In order for a non-moving party to oppose sucessfLilly a motion for summary judgment and send the
issue to a fact-finder,- it is not necessary for the
party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show "facts" controverting the facts stated in the moving party's
affi davi t-

Sait_Lake_Cit£^
(Utah Ct. App.

, 761 P. 2d 42
1988).

This threshold standard has been explained in the fol
lowing manners
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute
averments on the other side of a controversy
and create issues of facts precluding summary
judgment.
yplbrggk^Co^^v^^Adams, 542 P.2d

191

(Utah

1975).

The threshold standard for summary judgment has been
articulated in a number of ways.

It is, however, clearly a dif-

ficult standard to attain:
Summary judgment cannot properly be granted if
the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint
stand in opposition to the averments of the affidavits so that there are controverted issues of
fact, the determination of which is necessary to
settle the rights of the parties.

i-

Qt!Cistensfcn_ex_rei_C^^
101, 377 P.2d

1010

14 Utah 2d

C963).

"The presence of a dispute as to material facts disallows the granting of summary judgment. "
v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah

iiLL~§L2WQ_B§§LtVj_ J Q C „_

1977).

"Unless ther e i s a showi ng that the d± sf avor ec.i par t I es
cannot, produce evidence that would reasonably support, a finding
in their favor on a material or determinate issue of fact, a summary judgment is erroneous."
353 P.2d 909

§CLd^§:_:£jL~§§Ekman ,, 10 Utah 2d 366,

(1980).

It must appeal to a certai^nt^ (emphasis added)
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state oi facts which could be
proved in support of its claim before a judgment
on the pleading may be granted.
Securitv^Credit^Core^

v^Will^;, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P. 2d 422

(1953)„
A summary judgment must be supported by evidence, admissions and inferences which, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser,
show that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"; such
showing must preclude all reasonable possibilities that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor.
BuMgck_v^_Desere^
P. 2d 559

11 Utah 201, 354

(1960).
Such showing (no genuine issue of material fact)
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
possibilities that the losing party could win if
gi ven a tri al.

21

Ecederick^Ma^^&^Co^^v^^Dun, 13 Utah 2d. 4 0 , 368 P.2d 266
^ u d k i n s _ v ^ T g g n e , 27 Utah 2d. 492 P.2d 9S

(19b2);

(1972).

Summary judgment should he granted only when it
is clear from the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot, prevail.
QQQd^t-'ii-D^J^J^i^

739 P. 2d 634 (Utah Ct.. App.

1987); B r a ^ L i n e s ^ v ^ J J t a ^ ^
App.

739 P.2d

1115 'Utah Ct.

1987).
The above quotations and referrences illustrate the

difficult burden needed to sustain a summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
The Court will discover that there are sufficient disputed
material

facts in the record^

favorable to Knox, proscribe

which, when viewed in a light most
the Trial Court's finding that the

discovery of the alleged fraud by misrepresentation occurred in
1986 as a matter of law.
The Third-Party Defendant seeks reversal of the Order granting Summary Judgment, and a remand for a trial on the matter.

Dated this 11th day of Pebrua

endant
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MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I do h e r e b y c e r t i f y that on t h i s 11th clay of Febr ,.iarv
I did p e r s o n a l l y mail 2 t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p i e s of t h e
•f or eg o i n q d oc umen t t o:

15

"00 Fa-t

Suite 202

S. G e o r g e ., U t a h S 4 7 7 0
and
Michael D. H u g h e s
T h o m p s o n , H u g h e s & Reber
1.48 East T a b e r n a c l e
S t , G e o r g e , Utah 8 4 7 7 0
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C. G. Miller Appraisal Service
333 West 400 North . St George, Utah 84770
673-3681 . 628-5578

Mr. Crag Knox
S t . George, Utah

May 1, 1986

Sear Mr. Knox,
As you have requested, C.6. Miller Appraisal Service has carefully
examined your hone located at (20 North 201* East, Panorama Park, St.
George, Vtah, for the purpose of determining It's fair market value.
• fully •scum—ted report will sot he presented at this time, out is
available upon rsajsmst. This report would include cempaxaoles, a
site plan, dimensions, etc.
After thorough'consideration of available information, X would estimate
the value of your homo to he $»«.300.00

Sincerely,

tmmfXnma •. Miller
Appraiser

.

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Time statute commences to run.
—Completion of construction.
Cited.

EXHIBIT # 2

Constitutionality.
Seven-year limitation is applicable to the
owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or to their successors; those in possession and control of realty have a continuing
duty to make repairs, and should discover any
fault in construction within seven years; claim
that the statute is unconstitutional is without
merit. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah
1974).

Time statute commences to run.
—Completion of construction.
This section provides the time when the statute of limitations commences to run as being at
the completion of construction, and not discovery of negligence. Hooper Water Imp. Dist. v.
Reeve. 642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982).
*"
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp. (D.
Utah 1986) 634 F. Supp. 100.

COLLATERAL REFERENCESAm. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and
Construction Contracts § 114.
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper performance of work by private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d 914.

A.L.R. — Time of discovery .
ning of statute of limitations ir
action, 49 A.L.R.4th ?" n
Key Numbers.
55(3).

78-12-26. Within three years.
Within three years:
.
^^
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon oKiojur^-toreal property;
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such
waste or trespass.
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the defendant.
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party oi^th^facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other
-*n for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
280

EXHIBIT § 3
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(•) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
crow-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
ttpiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
• motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
lopporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
ptrt thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
crois-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
fcvor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hpaHnpr ^The adverse party prfor to the
jday of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
jitndered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
iisd admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
/DO genuine issue as to any material fart an^ that the moving party ia enfcitleH

fto a judgments a matter ofjaw/ A summary judgment, interlocutory in
/:
character, may be rendered onthe issue of liability alone although there is a
Itnuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
thai is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
ihall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made, and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the_
—mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his responseTT)^ affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, musTset torth specific t'artA alinying tha ~
there is a genome* iS6ue for trial If t>e don not BO rnpondj summary judgmenftHf appropriate, SfoglTHEie entered against him.
/ (0 Wheft arnaavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
/ of a party Apposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
/ affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
/ application for judgment or may orders continuance to permit affidavits to be
/ obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
/ other order as is just.

